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Resumo: O presente texto aborda o tema dos direitos humanos, da cidadania e da
desigualdade, procura responder a questão: “como fazer para que sociedades
democráticas, mas divididas, expandam direitos e benefícios a todos os cidadãos?”.
Para tanto, procura-se relacionar exemplos do direito penal, do direito
constitucional e das Cartas de Direitos. Discute, ainda, os discursos da Suprema
Corte do Canadá e as atividades do Ministério Público Brasileiro.
Resumen: En este trabajo se considera la cuestión de los derechos humanos, la
ciudadanía y la desigualdad, trata de responder a la pregunta: “cómo puede ocurrir
en las sociedades democráticas, pero divididas, la expansión de derechos y
beneficios para todos los ciudadanos?”. Para que trata de relacionar ejemplos de
derecho penal, derecho constitucional y de las Cartas de Derechos. Considera,
aún, los discursos de la Corte Suprema de Canadá y de las actividades del Ministerio
Público de Brasil.
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Introduction
In this talk I want to address a question within the broad topic of democracy
and human rights, a question which seems to me particularly urgent and important:
How can democratic societies extend and guarantee rights and benefits to
all citizens?
This question arises in settled democratic societies as they come to
acknowledge their social divisions, and in post-conflict societies as they work to
democratise or, in the case of Brazil, to re-democratise after periods of undemocratic
government. The United Kingdom in fact is in both of these situations: most of
the country is long settled, but having to face increasing problems of division and
diversity as our immigrant population increases, but in Northern Ireland, the conflict
between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries is only recently over, and a new
Bill of Rights has been introduced to extend rights to those who suffered exclusion
and discrimination in the ‘troubles’ between the Protestant and Catholic
communities. Brazil is also in both situations: as well as still being in the process
of re-democratization after the military regime, it is also one of the most progressive
countries which recognise the need to strengthen the inclusion of social and ethnic
minorities (the urban poor; the minority communities of the Amazon regions, for
example) in the democratic and economic life of the nation.
I will first of all look at some mechanisms and procedures that democratic
societies can utilize to make sure that the human rights of all their citizens are
promoted and protected by the institutions of law. I will look at some theories and
models which have been proposed by writers in relation to this question, and will
also look at glimpses of theories in action in actual societies, or implications of
the theories for policy and practice. In discussing this question, I will be looking
at theories of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics, and I will also be looking
at the relationship between criminal/penal law, Constitutions, and Charters of Rights
and Freedoms. The two examples I will discuss are the discourses of the Canadian
Supreme Court, and the activities of the Ministerio Publico in Brazil.
1. Principles of justice for divided societies
 There are two principal situations in which the issue of extending rights
to previously excluded or marginalised groups arises. One is the situation of a
well-established democracy which, for whatever reason, becomes more ready to
acknowledge that there are groups of citizens who do not share the supposed
rights and benefits of membership of that society. The other is the post-conflict
situation, where some groups have been deliberately excluded from full citizenship,
and law had come to be seen as a means of oppressing these groups rather than
extending rights and benefits to all. Canada is an example of the first situation,
post-apartheid South Africa the prime example of the second. Brazil is something
Arte-Livro Argumenta-7.pmd 15/1/2008, 19:10244
Revista do Programa de Mestrado em Ciência Jurídica da Fundinopi 245
of a hybrid: its new constitution was promulgated following the end of the military
regime, but of course it had an established tradition of democracy before that.
Brazil also shares the widespread trend for developed ‘new world’ countries to
recognise continuing marginalisation and injustice associated with slavery and
colonisation; Canada was prompted to enact a new Constitution when it did in
order to appease the separatist movement of French-speaking Quebec.
Diversity and division are unavoidable; they are conditions of modernity,
made more complex over the centuries by population movements associated with
wars, famines, imperialism, the slave trade and other drivers of migration. The
citizens of modernity do not live in the near-homogeneous societies envisaged
both by traditional forms of indigenous justice, and by the Enlightenment
philosophers and politicians who developed the theories and institutions of justice
that were implemented in Europe and exported around the globe: Brazilian law
and governance is largely based on the Portuguese tradition; Canadian on the
English. Post-Enlightenment liberal theories were based on the lives and interests
of a narrow – and therefore not radically pluralist – group of persons: white,
property-owning males. These theories did not concern themselves about rights
of indigenous people or slaves: they were ‘barbarians’ who would respond only to
tyranny. But the radical divisions in modern societies mean that these
Enlightenment principles, which served well in the move from absolutist to
constitutional governments, are no longer adequate to realise the aims of democratic
societies in regard to rights; that is, they have not proved effective for the extension
of rights to all citizens. Issues of rights of minority groups to cultural recognition;
rights of women; rights of temporary workers, rights of those who appear to threaten
the physical security, economic well-being or preservation of culture of democratic
societies make new principles and procedures of justice necessary. Democratic
but divided societies must adjudicate competing rights claims; they must find
ways of including the hitherto excluded and marginalised; they must acknowledge
and accommodate hitherto unrecognised identities; they must define rules of
membership and decide which rights are membership rights and which are universal
human rights; they must establish rights and responsibilities in relation to fields
new to governance, such as environmental concerns. They must find modes of
accommodation and establish procedures of fair co-operation between groups and
individuals who may have different and even conflicting interests and ideas of the
good life.
In order to deal with conflicts and to include the formerly excluded, many
writers are demanding that discourse should become the basic principle for
processes of justice. This principle of discourse is expressed in different ways in
various strands of political/legal philosophy, but deliberative democracy based
on discourse ethics is currently an extremely influential model of justice for
democratic societies. The essence of the model follows Habermas’s move from
Kant’s principle that rules should be capable of achieving consent of all rational
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beings, to the principle that rules should be those that are actually consented to by
all those likely to be affected (Habermas 1984,1987; 1996). Gutman and Thompson
describe deliberative democracy as:
A conception of democratic politics is which decisions and policies are
justified in a process of discussion among free and equal citizens or their
accountable representatives…Its fundamental principle is that citizens owe one
another justifications for the laws they collectively impose on one another. (Gutman
and Thompson, 2000: 161)
Inclusion of the hitherto excluded or marginalised is emphasized by Seyla
Benhabib (1992, 20002, 2004 and 2005), by Iris Marion Young (1990, 2002) and
by Nancy Fraser (1997, 2003). These writers all argue that those who have been
excluded from the discourses through which laws are made and interpreted; in
which criteria for relevance and irrelevance in considering cases are established;
in which rights and obligations are identified and distributed, should receive special
consideration to make sure that they are brought within the discourse of justice.
They also advocate measures and rights to do with education and access to promote
what Fraser terms ‘parity of participation’ in democratic discourses, the goal being
that all should be able to participate on equal terms. (Fraser 2003).
Looking at examples of lack of rights and exclusions from the discourse
of justice demonstrates the fact that deliberations and discussions need to be
relational (Minow, 1990; Young, 1990, Hudson, 2003, 2006a). People are
disadvantaged and excluded because the social groups of which they are members
are disadvantaged and excluded. In certain regards women are disadvantaged
compared to men; black people are disadvantaged and excluded compared to white
people; in Europe migrant communities such as Roma are disadvantaged and
excluded compared to settled and property-owning groups. The discourses of
justice in divided societies therefore need to allow people to speak for themselves
as individuals, but also to be able to be seen as representatives of groups. The
focus on the single relationship of individuals and states that is dominant in liberal
justice needs to be expanded to include relations between groups if rights and
remedies are to be extended to all citizens.
The discourse of justice also needs to be reflective. This does not mean
only that decision makers should engage in thought rather than merely looking up
the relevant rules, precedents and guidelines; the idea of reflective justice means
that cases should not be restricted to consideration only of legally prescribed issues
of relevance, and that cases should not have to be approximated to the appropriate
type of case, but that each case should be discussed in its uniqueness, with attention
to all its circumstances, and with all parties allowed to raise any circumstance and
any perspective (Ferrara, 1999). Cases should be discussed against ‘horizons of
justice and injustice’, such as oppression, equality, protection of human rights and
life chances as well as against legal categories and rules.
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2. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
One example of an expanded discourse of justice is provided by the open
and wide-ranging discussions of the Canadian Supreme Court in relation to the
implications of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for criminal justice.
It is now just over 20 years since adoption of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms in 1982, so there has recently been a flurry of reviews of its
influence (Magnet et al, 2003; Roach 2001, inter alia.) After its first 10 years, the
Charter has been described as “the stuff that dreams are made of” (Gold and Fuerst,
1992); as a conservative politics serving a conservative ideology, “meant to protect
the system not the public” (Mandel, 1998: 382) and many things in between. My
interest is in the extent to which the Charter has contributed to an expansion of
criminal justice discourse, and I have looked in particular at the ways in which it
has considered rights to equality and to protection of the morally innocent from
punishment.
The first glimpse of relationism in Canadian criminal justice discourse
came in the mid 1990s. A series of judgments in rape cases had raised the problem
of balancing defendants’ rights to ‘full and fair defence’ to the Charter right to
equality of protection of law. In a 1991 decision, the ban on introducing evidence
of a rape victim’s sexual history as evidence in all but a few narrowly defined
circumstances, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because it
allegedly restricted defendants’ rights to fair trial.1 Feminist campaigners, lawyers
and academics attacked this judgment as putting women’s legal position back two
decades (Sheehy, 2002). It was argued that the legal system was rolling back
women’s political gains. Parliament responded with an amendment to the criminal
code which made important changes to law’s definition of consent. As well as
specifying situations where there can be no consent as legally defined, there is a
very significant limit placed on the defence of “mistaken belief” in consent; the
new rules require men to take “reasonable steps” to ascertain consent before
engaging in sexual activity. This shifted the focus in rape cases from women’s
sexual history to men’s behaviour in specific situations. A subsequent decision
ruled that extreme intoxication was a defence to a rape charge, because of the loss
of judgment and control that this can bring about.2 Again, this was swiftly countered
by another amendment to the Criminal Code.
In both Acts of amendment, and in the criticisms and campaigns that
followed the judgments, the equality rights promised by the Charter were the
main basis of the argument. The question was whether or not these judgments,
and the legal rules and conventions on which they depended, were consistent with
1
 R.v  Seaboyer; R. v Gayne [1991] 2 SCR 577
2
 R. v Daviault [1994] 3 SCR 63
Arte-Livro Argumenta-7.pmd 15/1/2008, 19:10247
248 Revista do Programa de Mestrado em Ciência Jurídica da Fundinopi
the Charter’s guarantees of equal rights and equal protection. The Preamble to the
Criminal Code says that
… the Parliament of Canada recognizes that violence has a particularly
disadvantaging impact on the equal participation of women and children
in society and on the rights of women and children to security of the
person and to the equal protection and benefit of the law as guaranteed by
sections 7, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
(Bill C-72, Chapter 32, 1995)
Under the influence of groups such as the National Association of Women
and the Law, “equal protection” and “equal benefit of law” had been added to the
rights protected by the Charter. These groups were also successful in changing the
title of the relevant section of the Charter (Section 15) from ‘non-discrimination
rights’ to the more positive, affirmative action supporting ‘equality rights’. In
relation to rape, Canada has advanced further than most countries in changing the
emphasis in trials from women’s previous sexual history to men’s behaviour.
‘Reasonable assumption’ of consent is allowable in only a narrow range of
circumstances, and the trial court is now much more interested in steps taken by
men to obtain consent than in women’s sexual history.
In criminal justice, inequality is more often raised in the context of
disadvantages and discrimination suffered by different groups of defendants than
between victims and offenders. This relational concern can be seen in the Supreme
Court’s considerations of race discrimination. In cases concerning Aboriginal
Canadian defendants, it was argued that they suffered ‘systemic and historical
discrimination, and it was held that because of this the process of determining
sentence should be approached differently from the sentencing of other groups.
The sentencing court should first of all determine whether or not discrimination
and disadvantage had played a part in the criminality of the defendant, and if so,
this should be allowed to mitigate culpability. Alternatives to imprisonment were
to be considered in all cases, but especially in the cases of Aboriginals. In the
cases where this was established, it was argued that the systemic disadvantage
and discrimination was ‘unique’ to Aboriginals, and this claim of ‘uniqueness’
has been challenged. In subsequent cases (Borde and Hamilton) it was successfully
argued that African-Canadians also suffer ‘systemic’ discrimination and
disadvantage. These cases raise tensions between the relational approach and the
tradition of individual responsibility in western law. The compromise was that
discrimination and disadvantage issues should always be raised with defendants
from these groups, but that there was still a question of whether they were relevant
in individual cases. The cases also revealed that rather than the egalitarian society
Canada likes to believe itself to be, it too has substantial divisions and inequalities.
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The Aboriginal cases also introduced an element of reflectiveness. It was
argued that Aboriginals have a different conception of justice from that of most
white Canadians. They place less emphasis on retribution and deterrence, it was
held, and more on reconciliation and rehabilitation, and so restorative justice
approaches should be considered when the offender and victim are Aboriginal.
This approach has been criticized as involving a false idea of the homogeneity of
values among Aboriginal peoples, and also of opening the possibility of appearing
to take harms to Aboriginal victims less seriously than harms to members of other
groups.
It was a case concerning culpability that first aroused my interest in the
influence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 In this case, a 21year-
old woman, Marijana Ruzic, was convicted of importing 2 kilograms of heroin
into Canada. She claimed that a man in Belgrade, former Yugoslavia, where she
lived with her mother, had threatened to harm her mother if she did not import the
drug into Canada. She said that she did not seek police help because she believed
the Serbian police to be corrupt. Ruzic challenged the conviction on the grounds
that she was acting under duress. Ruzic follows an earlier case4 in extending the
Supreme Court’s mandate to consider statutory defences, and it extends the concept
of moral involuntariness to include considerations of blameworthiness that extend
beyond mens rea.
This appeal raises the issue of whether section 17 of the Canadian Criminal
Code, which specifies the requirements of duress, meets the Constitution
commitment to avoid punishment of the morally innocent (Shaffer, 1998). The
section requires immediacy of the threat and presence of the threatener, and an
implicit requiremement is that the threat is to the person who commits the offence.
Ruzic did not meet these requirements. Referring back to Langlois, Justice Laskin
argued that s.17 is too restrictive:
 The mother whose child is abducted, or Mr. Langlois whose family is
threatened, or Ms Ruzic who lives where the police cannot help her or
her mother, or the battered spouse who cannot leave her abusive
relationship, do not have a realistic choice but to commit a criminal offense,
even though the threatened harm is not immediate and the threatener is
not present when the offense is committed. ...Because s.17 permits the
conviction of some persons who fail to enjoy a realistic choice not to
break the law...it permits the conviction of the morally innocent. It therefore
licences the deprivation of liberty in terms inconsistent with the principles
of fundamental justice, and so is inconsistent with s.7 of the Charter.
(Klimchuck, 1998: 106-7)
3
 R. v Ruzic, [2001] 1 SCR 687
4
 R. v Langlois [1993] RJQ 675
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The Ruzic judgment broadens the grounds of moral involuntariness, and
moves towards a choice basis of culpability, widening the idea of culpable
responsibility from a narrow focus on agency alone towards looking also at the
social context of meaningful choice in which an action is carried out (Hudson,
1999; Norrie, 2000). It also establishes that it is within the remit of the Supreme
Court to examine statutory defences and mitigations to see whether or not they
meet the standards of ‘fundamental principles of justice’.
Another case which demonstrates elements of reflective discourse is that
of Lavallee, a woman who killed her abusive partner.5 This case is notable for the
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that it found it difficult to understand the
psychological effects of prolonged abuse on women (so-called ‘battered woman
syndrome’) and so heard evidence from witnesses who would not hitherto normally
have been included as experts, and who if called, would have been allowed only
to explain what accredited experts said about such effects and not to give opinions
about the individual defendant (Valverde, 1996). The circumstances of the killing
did not fit the criteria for self-defence because although Lavallee shot her partner
after he had been physically and verbally abusive, she did so with a rifle shot to
the back of the head as he was leaving their bedroom. Self-defence, according to
section 34 of the Criminal Code, requires that the individual has a reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from an immediate assault by the
victim and a reasonable belief that there is no other way to preserve their own life.
Lavallee did not meet these criteria, but the evidence of the expert witness on the
effects of abuse led to expansion of the criteria of ‘reasonable apprehension’ and
‘reasonable belief’ (Manfredi, 2001: 89). The judgment acknowledged that women
who had suffered abuse might not believe themselves to have the same range of
choices that men or non-abused women might perceive.
Canadian criminal justice has moved a considerable way towards
incorporating the principle of discursivesness, with relationalism and reflectiveness
as essential elements of justice discourse. It has become more open, in the manner
advocated by Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, most
noticeably in that a wider range of participants are included in justice discourses.
Feminist experts on the effects of prolonged abuse are given a voice in domestic
violence proceedings (Valverde, 1996). Victims and their advocates, representatives
of racial and ethnic groups can now give evidence less constrained by legal
language and procedures. One striking example of this greater openness is the
innovation of the Gladue courts in Toronto, where, following the Gladue case in
1999, reports in cases concerning Aboriginal defendants are prepared and presented
by members of Aboriginal community groups, rather than by ‘regular’ probation
officers.6
5
 R. v. Lavallee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852
6
 R. v Gladue (1999) 133 CCC (3d) 285* Professor da Università di Pavia (Italia)
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 Reading the post-Charter Supreme Court judgments, the range of
consideration, including academic writing, comparisons with other states, and
references to international conventions as well as the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, is striking. The Supreme Court has become an interlocutor for existing
law and is a participant with the Parliamentary government in the on-going
democratic conversation urged by proponents of deliberative democracy. More
than many other states’ justice processes which look only to the existing criminal
codes and precedents, the post-Charter Canadian discourse demonstrates the new
models of justice in action to a significant extent, and demonstrates that relational,
reflective discourse is important in extending rights to previously disadvantaged
and oppressed social groups.
3. Brazil’s Ministerio Publico
As you will appreciate, I feel some hesitation in talking about Brazilian
justice to a Brazilian audience: you all undoubtedly know a great deal more about
the issues and examples I raise than I could possibly do. But I do hope you will be
sympathetic to the spirit of friendship in which I make my comments. I am not, of
course, intending to give a comprehensive account of the activities of the Ministerio
Publico, but to mention some activities that I am aware of which seem to be
examples in actual existing practice, of the ideals and principles I am analysing
and championing.
In Brazil, the Ministerio Publico (the prosecutors) are charged with the
responsibility of establishing and protecting the rights and freedoms guaranteed
in the 1988 Constitution after the ending of the military dictatorship. Although
Brazil remains a deeply divided and unequal society, the ‘re-democratization
project’ is achieving important gains. One urgent need is to establish rights for
children, and prosecutors from the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, and Sao
Paulo were active in preparing the new law for protection of the rights of children
and adolescents, the 1990 Child and Adolescent Statute. Prosecutors from Sao
Paulo, in particular, influenced the contents of this statute, which increased
prosecutors’ powers to intervene on behalf of children, both individually and
collectively. Among its provisions, the Statute states that:
It is the duty of the family, the community, society in general and the
public authority to ensure, with absolute priority, effective implementation
of the rights to life, health, nutrition, education, sports, leisure, vocational
training, culture, dignity, respect, freedom, and family and community
living. (Law no 8,069, July 13, 1990)
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As is well known, the conditions in which many children and adolescents
live in Brazil means that the objectives of this law can by no means be said to have
been realised. The Ministerio Publico, however, has been active both in bringing
prosecutions where it can establish that rights have been violated (as in the case of
the prosecutions of military police for violence against street and favela children
in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), and in pressing municipal and state governments
to implement policies and provide resources to improve conditions and life chances
for children and adolescents. Prosecutors have raised awareness: lobbying
politicians, holding public meetings, and allying themselves with national and
international children’s rights organisations. Prosecutors have also sponsored and
promoted projects for children and adolescents.
Prosecutors have also become involved with the issue of child and
adolescent labour, the use of which is illegal, though widespread. In one instance,
prosecutors in the region of Ribeirao Preto, in the state of Sao Paulo, organized
surprise inspections of farms and plantations thought to be using under-age labour.
These inspections resulted in the removal of about 4,000 child or adolescent
workers from the farms and plantations (Silva, 2000). The preferred approach has
been discursive, the Ministerio Publico securing agreements from municipal and
state governments to institute policies for the protection and advancement of the
rights of children and adolescents, and from employers to cease using child labour.
Where employers have not entered into agreements or have not honoured
agreements they have entered into, there have been prosecutions, and there have
also been class action suits, with the local or state government as defendant, to
enforce or provide for the rights of children and adolescents.
As well as children, class action suits, with governments and employers
as defendants, have been mounted to promote and defend the rights of indigenous
peoples. Actions have been taken against seizures of indigenous people’s lands in
several areas, including Mato Grosso, Amazonas, and Maranhao. In some instances,
cases resulted in the contested areas being declared off-limit for mining and timber-
felling. Most of the legal actions have been taken against the federal government,
for failure to protect the territories of the indigenous peoples (Instituto
Socioambiental, 2004). With employers and corporations, the preferred approach
has been a problem-solving search for agreements. The Ministerio has also been
actively involved in prosecution of corrupt politicians, and in environmental matters
such as illegal logging and deforestation. Again, the preferred approach has been
seeking agreement, with criminal prosecution there as the ‘big stick’ for those
targeted who do not comply.
Although there is much to do to enhance rights and reduce inequalities
and oppression in Brazil, the Ministerio Publico’s adoption of the principles of
discourse – raising awareness, searching for agreements, enhancing the public
sense of the wrongs being done to children and to indigenous peoples, is the best
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hope for progress. The discourse of the Ministerio Publico demonstrates
relationalism in its targeting of activities which affect disadvantaged and powerless
groups, and it demonstrates reflectiveness in their participation in public debate,
their championing of the disadvantaged and their willingness to challenge elite
corruption. In terms of re-democratization, the Ministerio Publico has made a
highly significant contribution towards establishing legitimacy for law among
wider sections of the populations. These same activities have, of course, earned
the prosecutors the dislike of other sections of government and the power elites.
4. Canada and Brazil: The best of both worlds
I discuss the Canadian Supreme Court and Brazil’s Ministerio Publico as
examples of institutions whose policies and practices reveal elements of what
theorists call discursive justice/deliberative democracy. Of course, neither
institution has set out to implement these theories and philosophies, but their
interpretation of their goals and responsibilities has led them to operate according
to principles of relational, reflective modes of justice. Naturally, I am aware that
Brazil has a Supreme Court, and that Canada has prosecutors, and that there are
some similarities between these institutions in the two countries. So my purpose
in this talk is not to say the Canadian Supreme Court is better than the Brazilian,
or that the Ministerio Publico is more active and effective than its equivalent in
Canada. These things may or may not be so, but a direct comparison is not my
point, because the same-named institutions are not the same in practice. What
makes the difference is how the responsibilities for gaining and protecting
constitutional rights are allocated. In Canada, implementation and guaranteeing
rights is almost exclusively with the Supreme Court; in Brazil the post-military
Constitution gives many of these rights and responsibilities to the Ministerio
Publico.
So, although I am not making direct comparisons and trying to suggest
that one or other country has got better constitutional arrangements than the other,
I do want to make some comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the
institutional arrangements in the two countries. And my conclusion will be, of
course, that to be truly democratic and inclusive, the best solution would be to
have Canada’s Supreme Court and Brazil’s Ministerio Publico.
The great strength of the Canadian model is the publication of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms as a separate statute from the Constitution and from the
criminal and penal codes, and the specific responsibilities placed on the Supreme
Court in terms of protecting, implementing and interpreting the rights it prescribes.
This is a more effective political/legal commitment to rights and freedoms than
can be found in Brazil, where rights are included in the Constitution and in criminal
and penal codes, and although I don’t doubt the strength and sincerity of the
commitment of the framers of the Brazilian Constitution to rights and freedoms,
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having them embedded in different statutes does not give them the same quite the
same authority as in a separate Charter. To give an example of what I mean, when
I have given lectures in Brazil about the relationship between poverty and
punishment, people have said to me that the problems I talk about from my
knowledge of criminal justice in England are not problems here because in Brazil
there is a ‘necessity’ defence. Well, so there is in most European countries, and in
England we have a defence of duress, but that doesn’t stop the prisons being full
of the poor, while the crimes of the rich are far less frequently punished. And of
course the same is true of Brazil – the prisons are predominantly filled with the
poor and necessity seems too narrowly defined to reduce culpability for crimes of
economic hardship.
The examples I gave of Canadian Supreme Court cases show how defences
and mitigations are scrutinized to ensure that they take into account the
circumstances in which refugees like Ruzic, native poor people like Gladue, Borde
and Mason commit their crimes. If defences and mitigations in the criminal and
penal codes don’t properly cover the circumstances in which the poor commit
crimes, then the defences and mitigations have to be changed. The response I get
in Brazil – we have a defence of necessity – is the same as I get in the UK, which
is why our prisons too are full of the poor, the uneducated and unemployed, people
with mental health problems, sufferers of addictions and abuse. The Canadian
review of statutory defences and mitigations against standards of protection of the
morally innocent from punishment, equality of protection of law to less powerful
groups, of urging different considerations in sentencing for disadvantaged and
discriminated against groups, and other examples of analysing and arguing from
basic principles of justice rather than from existing codes, is something to be
admired. And I wish my country would move in that direction!
Canada has developed good discursive practive at using particular cases
to argue basic general principles, but Brazil’s Ministerio Publico is similarly an
example of spreading justice in practice that deserves to be supported, and to be
much better known in other countries. A recent Law Commission of Canada report
on social inclusion urges much more to be done to consult with groups such as
remote communities, street youths, and other groups of marginalised and excluded
people. The Ministerio is much more active in these things than a Supreme Court
could be, and indeed than similar institutions anywhere I have come across. Our
newly created Department of Constitutional Affairs could learn much from Brazil’s
prosecutors. Of course, as a visitor, and especially one whose Portuguese has not
progressed beyond the tourist basics of beginners’ language courses, much of my
information is from friends who are employees of the Ministerio, but I have
experienced enough to make me know the range of activities they are involved in.
In the autumn of 2005, I was in Foz do Iguacou at the time of the national-wide
municipal elections, and was in the senior prosecutor’s car when he drove round
to polling stations to make sure that there was no intimidation of voters. I have
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been shown photographs of youth projects and received more invitations to visit
projects than I am able to respond to, projects supported by prosecutors; I have
been introduced to a group of relatives of disappeared people by a prosecutor and
talked to prosecutors about their involvement in harm reduction drug projects.
The strength of the Brazilian approach is that it does not need to wait for appeal
cases to arrive to test issues of disadvantage and discrimination; the Ministerio
Publico lawyers can, and do, take initiatives to improve the situations in which
disadvantaged and discriminated-against groups live.
In the examples and writings I have discussed, some general implications
for criminal justice are clear. The example of the Canadian Charter suggests that
criminal and penal codes should be continually examined in discursive deliberation,
and that they must be subject to amendment if they do not satisfy the rights promised
by Charters and Constitutions. Existing codes and case-law cannot be allowed to
operate as limitations on extension of rights to all individuals and groups, and
cannot be allowed to lead to overly narrow interpretations of rights. The
transposition of rights from these sorts of constitutional documents to criminal
and penal codes and to case judgments needs deliberative bodies such as a Supreme
Court, and needs them to think relationally and reflectively about the rights of
those individuals and groups with whom they deal.
The example of Brazil’s Ministerio Publico suggests the need for a
institution involved in extending rights to have scope for activism in pursuing
areas where rights are either being violated or have not yet been established as
well as prosecuting ‘traditional’ sorts of criminal cases. Violations of rights of
individuals, groups and the community itself (the patrimony, which is an almost
unknown concept in the UK) need to be targeted as well as prosecuting violations
of the criminal code. Brazil’s prosecutors are expanding the justice agenda, just as
Canada’s judges are expanding the justice discourse.
This lecture has been concerned with extending rights and responding to
the acts of people, although they may be marginal and excluded, are recognised as
citizens who should be within the community of rights. The more our democratic
consciousness is expanded and comes to respect cultural and social differences
within our populations, and the more seriously we take the idea of rights as due to
all humans, not just those we deem to be ‘deserving’, more, and more difficult
questions come to be raised. Countries which, like Canada and Brazil, acknowledge
the need to extend democratic and human rights to all members of their societies,
beyond the narrow circle of successful and respectable citizens, face ever more
difficult problems such as rights for those who do not respect the rights of others;
prisoners’ rights; rights of religious minorities (whether to allow certain disputes
to be solved by Islamic Sharia law rather than English formal law is a current
issue in the UK), and even more difficult, what rights are due to non-citizens. But
that’s for next time.
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